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1 INTRODUCTION
Writing near the middle of the twentieth century,
and near the end of World War II, Karl Polanyi
(1957(1944)) interpreted the history of capitalism as
the tension between two movements. The dominant
movement, which originated with the capitalist ep-
och, was the utopian project to create a self-regulat-
ing market. Because it was utopian, that project
could have devastating consequences. The counter
movement consisted of the multitude of survival
strategies of social groups, and political responses of
states, to protect human communities and their natu-
ral habitats against those consequences. The Great
Depression and World War II were the most far-
reaching devastation so far. The three major self-
protective experiments of his time were the US New
Deal, Fascism, and Stalinism.
Now that all three mid-century experiments are
dead or worse, there has been a revival of the utopian
belief in the magical powers of the market to regulate
social life. Those who hold this belief appear imper-
vious to increasing evidence of chaos and destruc-
tion of the human and natural substance of society.
The new language of deficits and debts revives the
old belief that human communities exist through the
grace, in present terms, of investors. Salvation, in
this view, lies nOt in re-embedding production and
consumption in the needs and capacities of human
communities, but in other people's money. That
money is increasingly disembedded from any com-
munity or political agency, and moves across the
world, creating here and destroying there, at an
increasing pace.
This article points in bold strokes a picture of the
specific rules chosen to organize world commerce
and investments after World War II. The main
figures in the picture are national states, which
entered unequally into the original negotiations, and
evolving practices and powers, of multilateral or-
ganizations. As the picture becomes animated, these
figures begin to fade. States become less central as
they come into conflict not only with one another,
but also with the new creatures born from the post-
war rules, transnational corporations.
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2 NATIONAL STATES AND WORLD MARKETS
So far the political arena for playing out the tension
between the market and self-protection has been the
national state. Although it began much earlier, the
system of national states matured in the first two-
thirds of the 20th century. National states originated
in the 18th century with the American and French
Revolutions, quickly followed by national independ-
ence through much of Latin America, and later by
other major national state formations (in Europe,
Japan, and European settler colonies). World War I
ended the great Empires of Europe - Russian, Austro-
Hungarian, Ottoman - whose carving up into na-
tional states is still being contested in blood and
tears.
After World War II, anti-colonial struggles and so-
cialist revolutions, notably in China, completed the
political system of national states - all within the
framework of a titanic Cold War between the NATO
and Soviet blocs. These blocs already prefigured the
end of the sovereignty of national states even as
national independence completed the state system
throughout Africa, Asia, and the Caribbean. Alle-
giance to one or the other bloc implied subordina-
tion of sovereignty to a superpower, not only in
matters of war and peace as in former alliances, but
also in domestic politics, property relations, and
most of all, adherence to rules of international eco-
nomic practice (van der Piji 1984; Block 1977; Wood
1986).
The rise and compromise of national states paral-
leled the fall and rise of world capitalism in the 20th
century. The 19th century pattern of trade and
investment, which had integrated the globe, ended
with World War I. Then followed decades of insta-
bility - a boom in the 1920s, and a very large bust in
the 1930s. These gave way to massive state controls
over national economies and (hierarchically) inte-
grated economic efforts among the victorious Allies
in World War II.
3 POST-WAR CHOICES OF WORLD MARKET
RULES
The post-war rules of international economic rela-
tions established conditions for a new and deeper
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global integration by capital. However, these rules
were highly contested by proponents of an alterna-
tive model - national capitalism, planned by states,
including management of national currencies in
relation to domestic objectives. This implied the
subordination of international trade and capital flows
to national planning. Trade would be negotiated
among strong states seeking to enhance national
plans through imports of specific goods and of
capital for specific purposes (Block 1977).
The rules actually chosen to regulate international
economic relations, and the institutions enforcing
them, favoured free movement of goods and capital
via use of the US dollar as international currency.
These rules created an inevitable tension between
national states/economies and transnational organi-
zation of production. Instead of the strong interna-
tional institutions hoped for by the left governments
of post-war Europe and by progressive figures in the
US government, a series of decisions created weak
institutions whose effectiveness depended on the
strength - and the policies - of the US. All these
decisions were made between 1944 and 1947.
The Bretton Woods monetary rules, which estab-
lished the dollar as international currency, worked
only because of the integrative role of US foreign aid,
first to Europe, Japan, and European colonies through
the Marshall Plan, later to the emerging Third World
(Wood 1986; Friedmann 1982, 1990). Aid was the
mechanism that allowed investment and trade to
occur despite lack of dollars, and allowed
transnational capital to move into countries with
inconvertible currencies. The International Mon-
etary Fund, far from its theoretical potential as a
world central bank regulating a world currency, was
originally a minor institution designed to give auto-
matic access to members for short-term loans to
cover balance of payments deficits. This is a far cry
from its present role, which though more powerful,
is still distinct from the responsible role of a world
central bank.
The IMF is now collector of official debts and en-
forcer of uniform policies which dismantle the eco-
nomic regulatory powers of states. Precisely be-
cause it remains implicit, the force to which states
must 'adjust' their economies, via 'structural adjust-
ment' measures, is nothing else than the utopian
'self-regulating market' (whose 'self-regulation' para-
doxically requires considerable 'adjustment' by
states). The complex interplay between state sup-
ports for 'markets' and disempowerment of states is
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part of the unfolding tension between declining US
economic dominance and increasingly unregulated
(i.e., chaotic) markets, particularly currency mar-
kets.
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT),
likewise, was a feeble alternative to the proposed
International Trade Organization (ITO), which would
have established a strong international institute to
regulate trade through ongoing multilateral nego-
tiations (Rau 1957). The US initiated the ITO, but
then allowed it to lapse by failing to bring the
negotiated treaty to Congress for approval. The
GATT began in anticipation of the ITO, as an ad hoc
group of self-selected governments intended to be
subsumed by formal negotiations after the ITO came
into effect, Despite the failure of the ITO, it contin-
ued as an ad hoc set of negotiations, called 'rounds',
among self-selected countries.
Although much trade liberalization occurred among
advanced capitalist countries, the GATT did not
include states that maintained inconvertible curren-
cies. Until the debt regime and the collapse of the
Soviet bloc created a narrower set of options for
socialist and third world states, the GATT remained
a rich country club. Once their economies were
opened through various forms of 'structural adjust-
ment', the GATT posed little further threat, and
offered the only forum in which the new members as
a group could press for reciprocal openness to the
world's largest national markets (Raghavan 1990).
Even more telling, because it left no trace even in
weak international institutions, was the defeat of the
proposal for a World Food Board (WFB). Like the
ITO, the WFB was sacrificed to US agricultural
interests which prevailed over the larger, and more
consistently trumpeted, US interest in multilateral
institutions favouring the free flow of goods and
capital internationally. The integrative mechanism
of the world food economy fell to US food aid, and
via that opening, to transnational agro-food corpo-
rations. That is the reason for the omission of
agriculture, originally at US insistence, from the
GATT agreements. US agricultural interests were
also part of the national lobby which prevented the
creation of a strong multilateral organization, with a
stable mandate, membership, administrative staff,
and budget appropriate to the task of regulating
international trade - independent of the relative
strength of the US economy and the vagaries of US
national policies (Peterson 1979; Friedmann 1993).
4 NATIONAL REGULATION AND
TRANSNATIONAL INTEGRATION
The result of the post-war rules - and the interna-
tional relations which unfolded through their opera-
tion - was a particular structure of international
markets. The tension in US policy between
multilateralism and national interest was at the heart
of decisions leading to the IMF, the GATT, and other
institutions (such as the World Bank), rather than to
the stronger multilateral alternatives proposed (and
widely supported) after the War.
US national regulation of money, trade, and the rest,
in turn prompted other countries to institute strong
national regulation. Even within the US set of
alliances (and certainly outside it), it was difficult for
the US to oppose policies parallel to its own. Thus
the idea of 'national economic development' coex-
isted with the idea of 'free enterprise' (i.e., free trade
and investment), and the practices of national eco-
nomic planning, currency and trade controls, and
the like coexisted with transnational private invest-
ment.
The glue of the international economy, therefore,
was created by transnational corporations and banks.
Internal transfers between branches of transnational
capital came to account for increasing proportions of
international trade (Helleiner 1981). The
transnationals emerged within the framework of
highly regulated national economies. They created
transnational sectors that disarticulated 'national'
sectors from one another (Aglietta 1979). For in-
stance, the Canadian aircraft industry which made
wings was less related to other Canadian industries
than to the US aircraft industry which made the
matching bodies. Similarly, the French dairy indus-
try, making regional cheeses, was less related to
other French farms than to the US farms from which
it imported soybeans and maize as feedstuffs. In the
second case, the attempt to reverse this dependence
in the 1980s through import substitution via Euro-
pean Community agricultural policy remains a ma-
jor obstacle to concluding the present GATT agree-
ments.
The rules which allowed both transnational integra-
tion and national economic regulation were bound
to produce an impasse eventually. Their coexisence
depended on two conditions - US economic domi-
nance and the balance of power in favour of states
relative to transnational corporations. Both have
shifted decisively. Official debts and the collapse of
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the Soviet bloc are only two of the many factors
which finally brought the latent conflict to a head
5 THE CRISIS OF INTERNATIONAL
REGULATION
The brief span of this article precludes an account of
the precipitating incidents and shape of the crisis
which issued from the impasse between national
regulation, dominated by US economic strength,
and transnational integration, which accompanied
the rise of transnational corporations. Still, several
features can be identified. First, the rules of interna-
tional economic relations failed to sustain order and
were abandoned or changed in the years between
1968 and 1973. These rules were primarily con-
cerned with pegging the US dollar to gold and other
currencies to the US dollar. This became less and less
effective as Eurodollar markets expanded in the
1960s, and US institutions lost control of the world
money supply. The US response, to abandon the
Bretton Woods rules, left a vacuum of control, and
markets in multiple currencies developed in many
parts of the world.
Second, the international monetary crisis of the early
1970s coincided with an energy crisis and a food
crisis. The energy crisis precipitated a global reces-
sion, as industries and consumers had to pay more
for energy. The shift from profits on production to
mineral rents created a pooi of accumulated capital,
which had few profitable outlets. The oil-rich states
deposited their revenues in transnational banks,
thus fueling the explosion of money. The banks lent
the money to Third World and socialist states, eager
to shift from official lending, with its stringent con-
ditions, to private loans. This greatly expanded the
accumulated official debt of the preceding decades.
At the same time, Third World and socialist states
required greatly increased loans simply to maintain
existing levels of imports of energy and food at
prices two to three times their 1970 level. For this and
other reasons, few countries were able to invest the
loans productively, precipitating the debt crisis of
the 1980s (Wood 1986).
Finally, the ineffective political responses to falter-
ing international regulation left the field to the
transnational corporations and banks. The US
adopted aggressive national policies, particularly in
relation to money and agricultural exports. As
international conflict grew, corporations increased
the rate of industrial restructuring, both socially and
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geographically. This put pressure on employment
and public expenditures in advanced capitalist coun-
tries. The mounting public sector deficits came
increasingly to be financed by international capital
flows. Thus the problem of capital flight began to
constrain social policy even in the privileged core of
the world economy, just as in the Third World.
The international institutions which depended on
US economic strength, and on the responsibility and
effectiveness of US policy in relation to international
regulation, were the only available means for private
capitals to coordinate their activities on an interna-
tional scale. Banks, supported by major states,
strengthened the debt enforcement powers of the
IMF, including its ability to force debtor states to
withdraw from managing production, trade, cur-
rencies, and income distribution within their domes-
tic economies. Other international institutions were
strengthened, such as the World Bank, and (yet to be
agreed) the GATT. All of these projects strength-
ened only those powers relevant to the short-term
interests of private capital.
This short-term, limited perspective compromises
the ability of international institutions actually to
create and enforce new rules for stable world mar-
kets. These depend on a degree of autonomy, ac-
countability, and legitimacy so far achieved only by
national states in relation to civil societies. The
dilemma of international regulation is double. On
one side, states cannot regulate their national econo-
mies because of capital flight, and they cannot pro-
vide stable conditions for investment of capital be-
cause a national scope is not sufficient for
transnational capital. On the other side, interna-
tional institutions inherited from the post-war settle-
ment depend on US power, which now resides
mainly in the military, not in production, trade, or
money, and on responsible use of that power, which
has so far been sacrificed to US national interest.
6 WHAT RULES ARE POSSIBLE FOR WORLD
MARKETS?
Two paths are no opening. One favours accumula-
tion, that is, the further subordination of national
powers to transnational private capitals. The other,
much less clearly delineated, offers the prospect of
successful coordination of the many movements of
self-protection for human communities and their
natural environments.
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The main movement over the past decade has been
to reorientate international institutions from national
states, which answer to their respective civil socie-
ties, towards the accumulation of transnational capi-
tals. This attempt, still incipient, involves changes in
states themselves. One approach to these comple-
mentary is the idea of an incipient 'transnational
state' (McMichael and Myhre 1991). This term refers
to a common phenomenon, in which states shift the
balance between ministries concerned with trade
and finance on the one side and those concerned
with social services on the other. The relative status
and power of the former have increased greatly
relative to the latter, setting new limits to the demo-
cratic setting of priorities, or even the ability to
defend existing social programmes. At the same
time, trade and finance ministries are in increasing
communication with each other internationally, and
with the international agencies concerned with trade
and finance.
Although this process is contested, the officials in
each national ministry and in the international agen-
cies are arguable coming to share a common lan-
guage and belief in the inevitability and priority of
'adjustment' to international markets. These mar-
kets are self-regulating only in the shared rhetoric of
economic managers. In reality, they are being cre-
ated and shaped, but not controlled, by the increas-
ing openness and vulnerability of national econo-
mies to the movements of transnational investments.
As the latter seek to retain their value in an increas-
ingly unstable world, they move into ever shorter
term investments, and further destabilize each na-
tional economy, and the world economy.
The devastation to societies is becoming clear. The
destruction of the social basis for protecting human
communities and environments is leading to many
social movements to defend the old protections and
to create new ones. In particular, movements to
defend past social protection against poverty and
unemployment, and to create new forms of commu-
nity to promote livelihoods, are appearing every-
where in forms appropriate to local and national
conditions. At the same time, the destruction of
natural environments are inspiring protective move-
ments in many parts of the world.
A major form of movements for self-protection has
been local/regional and a major aim has been greater
autonomy. This puts further pressure on national
states, politically and from below, as a counterpart to
the economic pressure from above by transnational
capitals. So far these sporadic, local projects are
largely separate. Yet if viewed as variants of the
movement for self-protection against the utopian
project for a self-regulating market, now projected
on a global scale, it becomes possible to envision
links among them. At the deepest level, they can be
interpreted as social attempts to recover use value
(how do people in this community and nation define
their needs?) and labour (what energies and skills do
people have in this community and nation?)
Politically, linking movements is a distinct project at
each level. To link movements for livelihood and
environment, first of all, presupposes attention to
the relation between actual settlements and
bioregions. Livelihood depends on bringing to the
smallest possible level, often municipal or regional,
the common effort to link needs and capacities of
society and the natural habitat. Specifically, it means
creating local links between what is produced and
what is consumed, and all the social ties and activi-
ties in between - local economies. This is happening
through desperation where capital has abandoned
communities, and through choice where people have
become aware of the dangers of dependence on
mobile capitals to provide employment and the
goods necessary for life.
Of course, the world is irreversible integrated. To
embed the chaotic global economy in society now
requires democratic institutions at all levels. Local
economies will have to find ways to federate into
higher and more encompassing levels of political
coordination. The result of this type of politics, if
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successful, would be to create democratic institu-
tions capable of regulating the world economy in
response to the needs and capacities of the federated
communities.
National states are now being weakened from above
and from below. Yet they are all that we have at the
moment, to sustain the old protections against self-
regulating markets, and to respond to democratic
pressures to create new ones. Still they are an
increasingly weak thread of responsive power be-
tween people and the direct rule of capital. Self-
protection at this historical moment would seem to
require a combination of protection of the national
institutions inherited from a national period, and of
attention to new social relations to embed economic
life and new institutions of rule to support and direct
them. Local links between activities expressing the
needs and capacities of social groups are difficult,
but are easily understood in relation to experience,
once begun. They are vulnerable to transnational
capitals in many ways; the most successful are espe-
cially vulnerable to absorption and integration.
New forms of regulation, therefore, will require
support from existing national states and ultimately
from institutions at higher levels, including the world.
The examples of states collapsing without self-or-
ganized communities or effective international insti-
tutions are starkly evident in the news every day.
The project for federated, self-regulating communi-
ties, nested in bioregions of increasing scale, may
seem utopian. Yet the evidence of present strife
suggests that it is less utopian than the project of
capital to regulate itself.
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